Industrial Engineering

ABSTRACT In this paper we present a continuous-time network loading procedure based on the Lighthill–Whitham–Richards model proposed by and . A system of differential algebraic equations (DAEs) is proposed for describing traffic flow propagation, travel delay and route choices. We employ a novel numerical apparatus to reformulate the scalar conservation law as a flow-based partial differential equation (PDE), which is then solved semi-analytically with the Lax–Hopf formula. This approach allows for an efficient computational scheme for large-scale networks. We embed this network loading procedure into the dynamic user equilibrium (DUE) model proposed by Friesz et al. (1993). The DUE model is solved as a differential variational inequality (DVI) using a fixed-point algorithm. Several numerical examples of DUE on networks of varying sizes are presented, including the Sioux Falls network with a significant number of paths and origin–destination pairs (OD). The DUE model presented in this article can be formulated as a variational inequality (VI) as reported in Friesz et al. (1993). We will present the Kuhn–Tucker (KT) conditions for that VI, which is a linear system for any given feasible solution, and use them to check whether a DUE solution has been attained. In order to solve for the KT multiplier we present a decomposition of the linear system that allows efficient computation of the dual variables. The numerical solutions of DUE obtained from fixed-point iterations will be tested against the KT conditions and validated as legitimate solutions.

Over the last two decades, the electricity industry has shifted from regulation of monopolistic and centralized utilities towards deregulation and promoted competition. With increased competition in electric power markets, system operators are recognizing their pivotal role in ensuring the efficient operation of the electric grid and the maximization of social welfare. In this article, we propose a hypothetical new market of dynamic spatial network equilibrium among consumers, system operators and electricity generators as solution of a dynamic Stackelberg game. In that game, generators form an oligopoly and act as Cournot-Nash competitors who non-cooperatively maximize their own profits. The market monitor attempts to increase social welfare by intelligently employing equilibrium congestion pricing anticipating the actions of generators. The market monitor influences the generators by charging network access fees that influence power flows towards a perfectly competitive scenario. Our approach anticipates uncompetitive behavior and minimizes the impacts